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TO REQUIRE THAT A MAJORITY OF THE SUPREME
COURT DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF ANY CASE
BEFORE IT
Working within the authorization of Legislative Bill 244 of the
1969 Legislature,' the Nebraska Constitutional Revision Commis-
1 L.B. 244, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969):
"Section 1. There is hereby established the Nebraska Constitutional
Revision Commission to consist of twelve members. The Legislature
shall name six members of the commission, only three of whom shall
be acting legislators, with one legislator and one nonlegislator resid-
ing in each of the present Congressional districts. The Governor shall
name three members of the commission, with one of such members
residing in each of the present Congressional districts. The Supreme
Court shall name three members of the commission, with one of such
members residing in each of the present Congressional districts. Such
members shall be named within fifteen days of the operative date of
this act.
"Sec. 2. The members named to the commission under the provi-
sions of section 1 of this act shall meet in the State Capitol within
fifteen days of their appointment and organize by selecting a chair-
man and such other officers as it may desire.
"Sec. 3. The commission shall make a complete study of the
Constitution of Nebraska to determine what changes, if any, should
be made therein. The commission shall place special emphasis on
simplifying and condensing the Constitution for the purpose of giving
the Legislature broad powers, rather than numerous individual amend-
ments. In making such study, the commission may hold such hearings
throughout the state as it may find desirable and employ all neces-
sary personnel ...
"Sec. 4. The commission shall report its findings and any recom-
mendations for changes in the Constitution to the Legislature through
the Executive Board of the Legislative Council within one year after
adjournment of the 1969 session of the Legislature. The report shall
be made public at the time of its submission to the Executive Board.
The recommendations of the commission shall be considered at the
next regular session of the Legislature to determine which of them,
if any, should be submitted to the voters for approval or rejection.
"Sec. 6. The commission's existence shall be terminated at such
time as the Legislature may direct, but not before the commission
has reported pursuant to section 4 of this act.
"Sec. 7. This act shall become operative ten days after adjourn-
ment sine die of the 1969 regular session of the Legislature.
"Sec. 8. Since an emergency exists, this act shall be in full force
and take effect, from and after its passage and approval, according
to law."
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sion2 drafted a proposed Nebraska Constitution which it submitted
to the people, the governor, and the legislature on September 24,
1970.s One of the major recommendations concerning the judicial
article was to eliminate the requirement that five judges (one
more than a majority) must concur to declare an act of the legisla-
ture unconstitutiona 4 Under the proposed constitution, a majority
of the members sitting would pronounce a decision in all cases.5
The commission could find "no good reason" to keep the extra-
ordinary majority provision.6
After almost forty-seven years of dormancy,7 Nebraska's "five
judge rule" s has determined the outcome in three significant series
of appeals: State v. Cavitt;9 DeBacker v. Brainard° and DeBacker
2 Id. § 1. The Nebraska Constitutional Revision Commission consisted
of 12 members: 6 named by the legislature, only 3 of whom could be
acting legislators, with 1 legislator and 1 nonlegislator residing in each
of the present congressional districts; 3 named by the governor, with
1 of such members residing in each of the congressional districts; and
3 named by the supreme court, one each from the present congres-
sional districts.
3 REPORT OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION CoMinIsSION (1970).
4 NEB. CoNsT. art. V, § 2. After stating that the supreme court shall
consist of seven judges, the constitution declares: "A majority of the
members sitting shall have authority to pronounce a decision except
in cases involving the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature.
No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the con-
currence of five judges."
5 REPORT OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION ComvAIIssIoN, supra
note 3, at 52. The commission changed article V, § 2 to read: "A major-
ity of the members sitting shall have authority to pronounce a decision
in all cases."
6 Id. at 64.
7 The present 5 judge concurrence rule concerning the constitutionality
of legislative acts was adopted by the people of the state in a special
election oni September 21, 1920 (NEBRAsKA LEGISLATIVE COuNcIL,
NEBRASKA BLUE BOOK 103 (1968)), but the 5 judge rule did not con-
trol the result of a case until State v. Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d
171 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970). It is highly probable
that the rule was a latent force that weighed upon the minds of the
judges during the intervening years and possibly influenced the
court's decision indirectly in some instances.
8 This article is indebted to Comment, The "Five-Judge" Rule in Ne-
braska, 2 CREIGHTON L. REv. 329 (1969).
9 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996
(1970).
10 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 28
(1969). The Court held that the writ of certiorari had been improvi-
dently granted.
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v. Sigler;" State ex rel. Belker v. Board of Educational Lands and
Funds12 and State ex rel. Bessey v. Board of Educational Lands and
Funds.13 Following an analysis of the history of the present judicial
article and a consideration of the constitutionality of the five judge
rule, these recent Nebraska cases will be examined along with cases
from other states that have felt the thrust of a similar constitutional
restriction.1 4 Finally, a balance sheet of the advantages and dis-
advantages of such a restraint on judicial authority will be drawn
and appraised.
I. HISTORY
The Nebraska Supreme Court originally had no majority or
extraordinary majority requirement for deciding constitutional
questions, 15 but in 1872, the court applied a simple majority rule
in declaring a legislative act unconstitutional. 6 The Nebraska Con-
stitution of 1875 adopted this judicial decision,' 7 and the majority
requirement was continued when the judicial article was revised
in 1908.18 On April 21, 1917, the Nebraska Legislature resolved that
a proposal calling for a constitutional convention be voted upon
by the people of the state. 19 The electorate accepted the proposal
in the November 5, 1918 election and in the subsequent November
election of 1919, one hundred delegates were selected to attend the
1919-1920 Constitutional Convention. 20 The body of delegates to
the convention was considered to be a distinctively conservative
11 185 Neb. 352, 175 N.W.2d 912 (1970).
12 184 Neb. 621, 171 N.W.2d 156 (1969), ajfd on rehearing, 185 Neb. 270,
175 N.W.2d 63 (1970).
13 185 Neb. 801, 178 N.W.2d 794 (1970).
14 N.D. CONST. § 89; Omo CoNsT. art. IV, § 2 (1912).
15 The Kansas-Nebraska -Act, c. 59, § 9, 10 Stat. 277 (1854) and the
NEB. CoNsT. art IV, § 1 (1866) contained no requiremnt as to the
number needed for a decision of the supreme court. The court was
made up of a chief justice and two associate justices.
16 Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198 (1872), was decided by two of the three
judges, who declared unconstitutional a legislative act allowing only
white males to serve on juries.
17 NEB. CONST. art VI, § 2 (1875).
18 The number of supreme court justices was increased to 7. NEB. CONST.
art VI, § 2 (1908).
19 Neb. Laws c. 241, §§ 1-2 (1917); 1917 NEB. H.R. JouR. 1292.
20 The 100 delegates consisted primarily of attorneys (46) and farmers
(28). 1 PRocEEDiNas OF THE CoNsT TUTioNAL CoNvENTroN 1919-20, at
iii-vi (1920) [hereinafter cited as PnocF_ siTs].
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group,21 and their philospohy was later reflected in many of their
recommendations.
During the 1919-1920 Constitutional Convention, several pro-
posals were offered pertaining to the voting restraints to be placed
upon the supreme court, including one that the court could declare
an act of the legislature unconstitutional only upon a unanimous
vote.2  On February 5, 1920, the Committee on the Judicial Depart-
ment recommended that the convention adopt Proposal Number
313 which called for the concurrence of at least five of the seven
supreme court justices in order to declare void an act of the legisla-
ture.23 With little dissent, the convention incorporated Proposal
Number 3i3 into their proposed constitution, 24 and the five judge
rule was placed on the ballot as Proposed Amendment Number 16.25
Besides the conservative nature of the convention, two major
factors gave impetus to the 'limitation placed upon the court in
deciding constitutional issues. One of these was the Non-Partisan
League. The League originated in North Dakota and embodied much
of the Populist spirit although it went a great deal further in de-
manding state action for the benefit of farmers. The League advo-
cated state ownership of mills, processing plants and other farm
related industries. 2 The courts were an obstacle to many of its
plans because of their rigid defense of the capitalistic system. In
1937 before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
L. J. TePoel, Dean of Creighton College of Law, expressed the
sentiment of the 19191920 Constitutional Convention's judiciary
comhittee concerning the Non-Partisan League:
I happened to be on the committee of the judiciary branch of the
government at, that convention. At that time what Was known as the
nonpartisan league was high in Nebraska.... They appeared before
21 J. OLSox, HiSTORY OF NEBRASxA 276 (2d ed. 1966). The members of
the convention were elected without party designation from the same
districts and on the same basis as the members of the then state house
of representatives (as required by Neb. Laws c. 196, §§ 1, 3, 9 (1919)
and NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 2 (1875)). "The issues in the campaign
were not clear, but in the main the contest seems to have been between
the progressive and conservative elements of the state." Id. at 275.
22 Proposal Number 54: "No law, or act of the legislature, or an act
initiated by the people, shall be declared unconstitutional except by
a unanimous decision of the supreme court." 1 PRocsEDnnGs 115.
23 Id. at 676.
24 2 id. at 2697. The vote on Proposal Number 313 was 85 for and 9
against.
25 Id. at 2824. -
26 J. OLSM, supra note 21, at 264.
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the committee on the judicial branch of the government demanding
that the constitution be so amended as to take from the court the
the power to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional. We
refused to even entertain their views.... But there were a majority
on that committee who were a little afraid of what might happen
when we got to the people at that time, with the nonpartisan senti-
ment running so high in the State, and they were ready and willing
to compromise with them, and they said, "We will increase the re-
quired number from four to five."'27
The foes of the court's power to strike down legislative acts by
a simple majority also found able support in the words of such
individuals as Abraham Lincoln28 and, most particularly, William
Jennings Bryan. The second factor in bestowing the five judge rule
upon the state of Nebraska was the verbal support given by Bryan.
Throughout his career, he desired and advocated limitations upon
the judiciary's power to declare acts of the legislature void.29 On
January 12, 1920, Bryan addressed the Nebraska convention:
The fundamental principle of popular government, whether coercive
or co-operative, is that the people have a right to have what they
want in government .... Not that the people will make no mistakes,
but that the people have a right to make their own mistakes .... The
supreme court only should have power to declare a law unconstitu-
tional, and it only by three-fourths vote of the court. It is not fair
to the legislators or to those who elect them-especially when we
have referendum-to allow what they have declared to be the people's
will to be overthrown by one judge.S0
Bryan's opinion was held in high esteem by the members of the
convention and by the people of Nebraska. Thus, Proposed Amend-
ment Number 16 was primarily the result of the efforts of the Non-
27 Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, at 1772 (1937).
28 Abraham Lincoln in his inaugural address of 1861 referred to the
Dred Scott decision saying, "[Ilf the policy of the Government upon
vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed
by. decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in
ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people
will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent prac-
tically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal." THE PaRsinENTs SPEAK (3d ed. 1969).
29 In Bryan's famed "Cross of Gold" speech, he attacked the Supreme
Court's declaration that the income tax was unconstitutional, Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). COMMANGER,
DoCUMENTS OF AmERICAN HISTORY 626 (1963). Bryan gave his solid
support to the Borah Amendment, which sought to require the con-
currence of seven Supreme Court Justices before the Court could
declare a statute unconstitutional. LAvNE, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH,
WILI.AM JENNINGS BRYAN 225 (1965).
80 1 PROCEEDINGS 307, 319.
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Partisan League, the pleas of William Jennings Bryan, and the con-
servative makeup of the convention.
The five judge rule was presented to the people in a special elec-
tion along with forty other amendments, and on September 21,
1920, all forty-one proposed amendments were adopted by the elec-
torate at the special election.31 The vote that established the five
judge rule and the other constitutional provisions in issue was ex-
tremely light, with about one-sixth of the qualified electors turning
out.82 The tally on Proposed Amendment Number 16 was 77,58633
which hardly compares favorably to the presidential election vote
just six weeks later of 382,653. 4 The minority control of the supreme
court under the five judge rule on constitutional questions was
definitely adopted by a distinct minority of the qualified voters
within the state.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Although the constitutional validity of the five judge rule has
been questioned in dissenting opinions,85 the Nebraska Supreme
Court has not concerned itself with the issue, and in DeBaker v.
Sigler,36 it specifically found it "unnecessary to consider" the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of Article V, section 2.7 In 1930, the
Supreme Court of the United States in Ohio v. Akron Park District
considered the validity of the Ohio Constitution's limitation upon
31 NEBRASKA BLuE BOOK 103 (1968).
32 Id. at 104.
33 Id. The highest total vote on any of the amendments was 83,250 on
Proposed Amendment Number 3 which declared English to be the
official language of the state and which required common school
branches to be taught in that language. Separate ballots were pro-
vided for the women electors at the special election because there was
some doubt whether women could legally vote upon .constitutional
questions.
34 Id. at 763.
35 Justice Spencer has approached the constitutional issue in his dissents
filed in DeBacker v. Sigler, 185 Neb. 352, 175 N.W.2d 912 (1970) and
State ex rel. Belker v. Board of Educ. Lands & Funds, 184 Neb. 621,
171 N.W.2d 156 (1969).
36 185 Neb. 352, 175 N.W.2d 912 (1970). The constitutionality of the 5judge rule was placed squarely before the court by DeBacker. See
Brief for Appellant, DeBacker v. Sigler, 185 Neb. 352, 175 N.W.2d 912
(1970).
87 185 Neb. at 355, 175 N.W.2d at 913.
38 281 U.S. 74 (1930).
628 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 50, NO. 4 (1971)
the Ohio Supreme Court's power to review constitutional issues.89
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held the
Ohio constitutional restriction valid against due process ° and equal
protection4 ' claims and alleged violations of the guarantee to every
state of a republican form of government.4 2 The Akron Park de-
cision was adhered to in a later case in an Ohio federal district
court4 3 just eight years before the people of Ohio withdrew the
constitutional restraint.44
Viewing the Nebraska five judge rule with respect to the Akron
Park holding and the Ohio constitutional restriction, the Nebraska
rule appears in one respect more oppressive and in another much
less confusing. The Ohio Supreme Court could declare a law void
by majority vote if the court of appeals had also invalidated the
law;45 the Nebraska Supreme Court on the other hand must have
a concurrence of five judges to hold an act of the legislature un-
constitutional even though the district court struck down the act.
But in several instances, Ohio found itself with a law in force in
one or more appellate districts and of no effect in another appellate
district;46 at least in Nebraska, the minority decision upholding a
legislative act by a vote of three to four takes effect throughout the
state.
39 The Ohio Constitution stated: "The supreme court shall, until other-
wise provided by law, consist of a chief justice and six judges ....
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court
without a concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in
affirmation of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring, a law
unconstitutional and void." Omo CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1912).
40 281 U.S. at 80.
41 Id. at 80-81.
42 Id. at 79-80.
4 Toth v. Silbert, 184 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
44 Omo CoNsT. art. V, § 2 was amended May 7, 1968 to read: "A major-
ity of the Supreme Court shall be necessary to constitute a quorum or
to render a judgment." See note 39 supra for the text of the former
section.
45 See note 39 supra for the text of the Ohio Constitution.
46 For example, in City of East Cleveland v. Board of Educ., 112 Ohio
St. 607, 148 N.E. 350 (1925), a statute providing that a municipality
shall furnish water to a public school with charge was held constitu-
tional in the court of appeals, and the supreme court affirmed that
decision although 5 of the 7 judges considered it invalid. Subsequently
in Board of Educ. v. City of Columbus, 118 Ohio St. 295, 160 N.E. 902
(1928), the supreme court was able to strike down the same act be-
cause a different court of appeals had invalidated the law. The effect
was that the statute was void in one appellate jurisdiction and consti-
tutional in another.
TO REQUIRE MAJORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT 629
The reasoning of the Court in Akron Park may be put in some
doubt by later decisions of the Supreme Court and by further
analysis of the restraint. It can hardly be doubted that the high
court has taken an expanded view of the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause pertaining to individual and minority
rights since the Akron Park decision in 1930. The recent holdings
of Reitman v. Mulkey47 and Hunter v. Erickson8 illustrate the con-
cept that a state by constitutional amendment or a city by charter
amendment can not encumber the assertion of federal constitutional
rights. Because the five judge rule applies equally to federal con-
stitutional rights as well as to state constitutional rights, the extra-
ordinary majority rule may in some instances make it more diffi-
cult to exercise federal rights. A minority of three judges could de-
prive a person of a right arising under the United States Constitu-
tion.49 The aggrieved party could appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court of the United States or he possibly could have brought the
suit originally in federal district court.50
It also can be argued that Nebraska litigants are denied equal
protection of the laws and are not entitled to all the privileges of
citizens in the several states5' because in almost all other states
a simple majority may hold a legislative act unconstitutional, which
more easily assures the protection of federal and state rights. The
47 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (where a California constitutional amendment
allowing property owners to discriminate in the sale of real property
was held unconstitutional as a violation of the U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV).
48 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (where an Akron, Ohio city charter provision
made it substantially more difficult to secure enactment of open hous-
ing legislation than to pass other ordinances, the Supreme Court de-
clared such a system unconstitutional).
49 This definitely would not be the case in every situation for it "is only
in the areas where new constitutional principles are emerging that the
kind of question likely to split a court will arise. Because the federal
courts are the source of the gieeat mass of innovative constitutional
jurisprudence, such questions are quite likely to be federal questions."
Comment, The "Five-Judge" Rule in Nebraska, supra note 8, at 337.
50 The vehicle for entry to the federal courts, may be the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1964) or, possibly, a three
judge panel, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964), for injunctive relief against the
enforcement of a state statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964), or relief from
a person who, acting under color of state law, has deprived the com-
plainant of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Consti-
tution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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five judge rule places a potential roadblock in the path of constitu-
tional claims, a roadblock found in only one other state.52
Since 1930, the purview of the Due Process Clause has been
particularized to a test of whether a certain state procedure is in
conformity with fundamental or necessary Anglo-American views
of ordered liberty.5 3 Majority rule itself is a traditional Anglo-
American concept, and from the inception of this nation, majority
rule has been the fundamental principle in court declarations as to
the constitutionality of legislative acts.5 4 Thus the five judge rule
may be in violation of due process.
The Supreme Court has taken a less restrictive view of some
political questions, which raises the point that the Guarantee Clause
may contain more impact today. Finally, the potential hindrance
of the five judge rule to a successful assertion of federal rights may
run into conflict with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.5 5
All of these possible attacks upon the constitutionality of the
five judge rule are necessarily based upon the hypothetical that
five judges will not recognize and adhere to some constitutional
mandate. Although the federal courts are the source of much consti-
tutional and social change today, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
had an enviable record in sustaining constitutional rights when
its decisions have been reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court.56
52 North Dakota; N.D. CONST. § 89.
53 "In one sense recent cases applying provisions of the first eight
Amendments to the States represent a new approach to the 'incorpor-
ation' debate. Earlier the Court can be seen as having asked, when
inquiring into whether some particular procedural safeguard was re-
quired of a State, if a civilized system could be imagined that would
not accord the particular protection. For example, Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 .... The recent cases, on the other hand, have
proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes
are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems bear-
ing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has
been developing contemporaneously in England and in this country.
The question thus is whether given this kind of system a particular
procedure is fundamental-whether, that is, a procedure is necessary
to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).
5- Not until the Populist fervor of the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries did supreme courts find themselves under extraordinary
majority rules in dealing with constitutional issues.
55 Comment, The "Five-Judge" Rule in Nebraska, supra note 8, at
335-38.
56 Id. at 338, 341.
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III. RECENT EFFECT OF THE FIVE JUDGE RULE
State v. Cavitt57 in 1968 was the first case to patently realize the
full force of the five judge rule when a minority of three judges
upheld a legislative act which allowed the board of examiners to
examine each potential dischargee from the Beatrice State Home
to determine whether, as a condition precedent to discharge, that
person should be sterilized.5 DeBacker v. Brainard9 soon followed
with the minority of the court overriding the majority's opinion
that a juvenile under the proper circumstances had a right to trial
by jury and could be found guilty only if his guilt was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.0° Then came the "school land" cases
where the majority of the court in State ex rel. Bessey v. Board of
Educational Lands and Funds6' adhered to the opinion of the con-
trolling minority of three in State ex rel. Belker v. Board of Educa-
tional Lands and Funds6 2 concerning the constitutionality of the
statute but refused to give effect to the minority's interpretation of
the act. Instead, the majority followed the interpretation of the
statute which they had argued in Belker made the act unconstitu-
tional.
In Belker, the minority of three judges sustained the validity of
the mandatory sale of school lands saying:
[T]he constitutional provision which vests the general management
of all school lands and funds in the Board of Educational Lands and
Funds "under the direction of the Legislature" authorizes the Legis-
lature to direct the sale of school lands. Article VII, § 1, Constitution
of Nebraska....
[T]here is nothing in the act, nor in any legislative history alluded
to, which in any way limits or attempts to limit the jurisdiction or
power of the courts to determine, in a proper proceeding, whether
57 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968). See note 7 supra.
58 NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-504 (Reissue 1966). The mental health act, NEs.
REv. STAT. §§ 83-501 to -508 (Reissue 1966), was repealed by Neb.
Laws c. 825, § 1 (1969), and the Interstate Compact on Mental Health
was enacted in NFB. REv. STAT. §§ 83-801 to -806 (Supp. 1969). The
sterilization provision was omitted.
59 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 28
(1969).
60 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 43-206.03(2)-(3) (Reissue 1968). A majority of
the U.S. Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 39 U.S.L.W.
4777 (June 21, 1971) held that due process does not require extension
of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee to juvenile delinquency
hearings.
61 185 Neb. 801, 178 N.W.2d 794 (1970).
62 184 Neb. 621, 171 N.W.2d 156 (1969), aff'd on rehearing, 185 Neb. 270,
175 N.W.2d 63 (1970).
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the sale of any school lands was conducted in the manner required
by law.63
The majority in Belker feared deprivation of the Board of Educa-
tional Lands and Funds' trustee supervision over individual sales
and over the volume of sales that would occur in 1975 when over
half of the land leases expire. The majority saw an erosion of the
court's 1943 decision that any act by which the legislature sought to
assume direct control over the public school lands and remove the
control of the board was null and void.64 The unsuccessful majority
in Belker interpreted the words of the statutes65 and the legislative
history as requiring finality of sale upon a bid above the appraisal
price and payment within ninety days; thus the board and the courts
would be denied the right to question or to strike down the sale as
not in the best interests of the state.66
In Bessey, the state asked the supreme court to exercise its su-
pervisory trust jurisdiction over the school lands to set aside a suc-
cessful bid and order a new sale. The majority, which had not suc-
ceded in nullifying the law previously, denied relief holding that
the "statute was strictly complied with.. . 'in the manner required
by law.'"67 In this "prophetic sequel"68 to Belker, the absurdity
of the five judge rule came full circle:
In State ex rel Belker v. Board of Educational Lands and Funds, on
rehearing, . . . he majority of this court said: "The hist6ry of the
63 185 Neb. at 270-71, 175 N.W.2d at 63.
64 State ex rel. Johnson v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist.,
143 Neb. 153, 8 N.W.2d 841 (1943).
65 NEB. REv. STAT. § 72-257 (Reissue 1966): "All lands, now owned or
hereafter acquired by the state for education purposes, shall be sold
at the expiration of the present leases .... Prior to such sale, the
land shall be appraised for sale purposes in the same manner as
privately owned land by a representative appointed by the Board of
Educational Lands and Funds, and thereafter shall be sold at public
sale at not less than the appraised value." And the complementary
section, NEB. REv. STAT. § 72-258 (Reissue 1966), declares: "Such land
shall be sold, at public auction, by a representative of the Board of
Educational Lands and Funds or by the county treasurer of the
county in which the land is located, to the highest bidder. The
appraised value for sales purposes as provided in § 72-257 shall be
the starting bid price."
66 NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1: "The general management of all lands and
funds set apart for educational purposes, and for the investment of
school funds, shall be vested, under the direction of the Legislature,
in a board of five members to be known as the Board of Educational
Lands and Funds."
67 185 Neb. at 802, 178 N.W.2d at 796.
68 Id. at 801, 178 N.W.2d at 796.
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act shows conclusively that the Legislature intended that the ap-
praisal, sale, and payment were to constitute the sole basis for the
passing of ownership .... "
Now that the statute is declared constitutional we adopt and de-
clare the above holding herein as the proper and only interpretation
the statute could and should be given.69
The minority that had prevailed in Belker could not in Bessey im-
pose its interpretation of the statute.70 Because of this absurdity,
seven judges now considered the law unconstitutional as inter-
preted. This embarrassing situation is likely to occur often when
the extraordinary majority rule controls the outcome of a case.
Nebraska is just beginning to realize the effect of its five judge
rule, but Ohio and North Dakota have experienced similar court
limitations for many years. The Ohio Supreme Court attempted to
avoid the force of their constitutional restriction71 in some measure
by declaring in Village of Brewster v. Hill 72 that a municipal ordi-
nance was not a law within the meaning of the Ohio Constitution.7 3
And in R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Education 4
the Ohio Supreme Court circumvented the constitution's limitation
by accepting a censorship statute but holding that any exercise of
the censoring power under it would be unreasonable and unlawful.7 5
Ohio had many instances of confusion in its intermediate appellate
jurisdictions,76 and statutes were sustained by an embarrassing two
to five controlling minority until the people amended the Ohio Con-
stitution on May 7, 1968, to allow a majority to render all
judgments.77
The North Dakota Supreme Court has acquiesced, for the most
part, to their requirement of at least four of the five justices con-
69 Id. at 803, 178 N.W.2d at 796-97.
70 The minority believed the board and the courts had the power to set
aside a sale and accept a higher bid. Id. at 808-14, 178 N.W.2d at 799-
802.
71 OHO CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1912). See notes 14, 39, 44, 45 and 46 and
accompanying text supra.
72 128 Ohio St. 354, 191 N.E. 366 (1934).
73 Id. at 358, 191 N.E. at 367.
74 162 Ohio St. 263, 122 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
75 Id. at 268, 122 N.E.2d at 771.
76 Note 46 supra.
77 "A majority of the Supreme Court shall be necessary to constitute
a quorum or to render a judgment." OHIo CoNsT. art. IV, § 2 (1969).
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curring to overturn a legislative enactment or law.7 8 The court has
said that the amendment to limit the court's constitutional review
was "a rebuke to the courts for having gone too far in declaring
statutes to be void because of defects in the title or the procedure,"7 9
and that the power to declare acts unconstitutional "is too dangerous
and arrogant for use except on occasions very extraordinary."'S The
1919-1920 Constitutional Convention and the newly proposed Ne-
braska Constitution, as well as various constitutional amendments
in between, have remedied many of the title and procedure encum-
brances upon the Nebraska Legislature. And as will be discussed
later, although the power of judicial review may be dangerous and
arrogant on rare occasions, it is the absolute duty of the judiciary
to protect the will of the people as codified in their constitutional
compact.
Nebraska and North Dakota are the only states which have con-
stitutional provisions that require more than a majority concurrence
to hold a legislative act unconstitutional. Except for South Carolina
that requires either a unanimous decision of its five supreme court
justices or a majority decision by those five justices with the inclu-
sion of the sixteen circuit court judges,81 all other states by consti-
tutional provision, statute, court rule, or court practice allow a
78 "The supreme court shall consist of five judges, a majority of whom
shall be necessary to form a quorum or pronounce a decision . . .
provided, however, that in no case shall any legislative enactment
or law of the state of North Dakota be declared unconstitutional unless
at least four of the judges shall so decide." N.D. CoNsT. § 89 (1908).
79 Wilson v. City of Fargo, 48 N.D. 447, 455, 186 N.W. 263, 266 (1921).
80 Daly v. Beery, 45 N.D. 287, 307, 178 N.W. 104, 111 (1926).
s S.C. CONST. art. 5, § 12: "Whenever, upon the hearing of any cause
or question before the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original or
appellate jurisdiction, it shall appear to the Justices thereof, or any
three of them, that there is involved a question of constitutional law,
or of conflict between the Constitution and Laws of this State and of
the United States, or between the duties and obligations of her citizens
under the same, upon the determination of which the entire Court
is not agreed; or whenever the Justices of said Court, or any two of
them, desire it on any cause or question so before said Court, the
Chief Justice, or in his absence, the presiding Associate Justice, shall
call to the assistance of the Supreme Court all of the Judges of the
Circuit Court: Provided, however That when the matter to be sub-
mitted is involved in an appeal from the Circuit Court, the Circuit
Judge who tried the case shall not sit. A majority of the Justices of
the Supreme Court and Circuit Judges shall constitute a quorum. The
decision of the Court so constituted or a majority of the Justices and
Judges sitting, shall be final and conclusive."
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simple majority of the full court or of a quorum of the court to
decide a constitutional issue properly before the court.82
The extraordinary majority requirement placed upon a state
supreme court may cause confusion and embarrassment to both
the court and the litigants before the court. It would seem that the
parties on appeal would more readily accept the opinion of a ma-
jority of the court than that of the minority; in fact, justice may
demand it.
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IN PERSPECTIVE
From the addresses of William Jennings Bryan 83 and Abraham
Lincoln" and from the policies of the Non-Partisan League, 5 the
theme that can be extracted from the five judge rule is that the
will of the people as represented by the acts of their elected legisla-
ture should not be too easily thwarted by an independent judiciary.
This tends to overlook the fact that the courts interpret the con-
stitution as well as statutes, and the constitution is the first and
last expression of the will of the people.86 The courts and partic-
ularly the supreme court are obligated to defend the individual
and the minority from the caprices of the majority; whether corr or-
ate president or laborer, small businessman or criminal, the court
has a duty to protect their constitutional rights. In the words of
Chief Justice John Marshall:
It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department.
to say what the law is.... So, if a law be in opposition to the con-
stitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular
case, so that the court must decide that case, conformable to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformable to the constitution, dis-
regarding the law, the court must determine which of these conflicting
rules governs the case: this is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution
is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution,
and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both
apply.87
82 Comment, The "Five-Judge" Rule in Nebraska, supra note 8, at 349-51.
83 See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
s4 See note 28 supra.
85 See notes 26 and 27 and accompanying text supra.
86 Of course, the point can be made that if the constitution is the su-
preme will of the people, then the 5 judge rule which is contained
within the constitution is also the supreme will of the people. The
answer may be that the expression of the will of the people in 1920
is inadequate to express the total will of the people today. See note.;
32, 33, 34 and accompanying text, concerning the vote on the 5 judge
rule, supra.
87 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
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And in the expressive text of the address of John Lee Webster,
president of the Constitutional Convention of 1875, given before
the 1919-1920 Nebraska Constitutional Convention:
Mere majorities, majorities for the occasion-like the act of a partic-
ular executive, or the will of a particular legislator-rule only for
the occasion. Over them all rules the Constitution, whose organ of
utterance is the judiciary established by it.
[We have no hesitation in saying that the Department of the Judici-
ary exercises an essential and potent force in protecting the rights
of the minorities in commanding respect for the laws enacted by the
Legislature. It is, likewise, the trustee of the Constitution in and by
which the inalienable rights of the individuals are preserved.
We can see the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in hedging
it around with defenses against the attacks of popular majorities,
against their excited delusions and hasty errors, as well as to guard
it against the faithless and corruptible officers who may, for a time,
administer it.
Had not the framers of our system of government supposed it pos-
sible that legislative bodies might fall into error, they would not, in
their sovereign capacity, have adopted a written Constitution, su-
perior alike over themselves and the Legislature.8S
The Nebraska governmental system is divided into three co-
ordinate branches: legislative, 9 executive, 90 and judicial.91 Any
major dilution of the powers of one branch may injure the balance
of that system.92 Although it may be argued that the five judge
rule is a legitimate limitation upon the power of the judiciary, the
fact that the legislative branch in Nebraska is represented by a uni-
cameral, and the "checks and balances" of a two-house legislature
are absent, makes it more probable that there would be a greater
need for an independent and unhampered judiciary and supreme
court.
An exchange between James W. R. Brown 3 and Senator Ramey
88 1 PROCEEDINGs 276-79.
89 NEB. CONST. art. III.
90 Id. art IV.
91 Id. art. V.
92 See Mr. Justice Spencer's dissenting opinions in DeBacker v. Sigler
and State ex rel. Belker v. Board of Educ. Lands and Funds.
93 Mr. Brown, appointed by the supreme court from Omaha, was the
chairman of subcommittee 1 of the Nebraska Constitutional Revision
Commission which was assigned the judicial article of the constitu-
tion.
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C. Witney 94 during the proceedings of the Constitutional Revision
Commission illustrate some of the above points:
Mr. Brown-It is a matter of judicial judgment with respect to
whether it invades the constitutional rights of the person. Now I can
grant you that perhaps a minority in some instances may be, let's
say arrive at a better conclusion than the majority. I would think that
the contrary would most likely be the situation and certainly that is
what we generally accede to and that is the majority is more likely
right than a minority, and, therefore, on this one I feel rather strongly
in favor of our recommendation.
Sen. Witney-The thing I have in mind is that in my judgment the
courts have tended to do more than interpret the Constitution. In
many cases in my judgment they are attempting to make the law,
rather than to interpret the law and if they tend to make the law
that is a philosophy then there should be an extra person there who
should have the vote with reference to the interpretation of the Con-
stition in order to make it valid.
Mr. Brown-Well, I would agree with you that in some instances
that is true and the courts do attempt to make law. I would be hope-
ful that the larger number of judges do not do that; and therefore,
I think the requiring a majority is more likely to accomplish your
objective than permitting a minority who may depart from what
we expected as the proper norm for judges would do. In other words
there you might have a couple who would be departing from what
we expect from our judges; and, therefore, the majority might be
going down the proper line. We would. .. again, I would expect
that that would be more likely than not and that therefore the per-
mitting a minority to control might very well implement what you
don't like and what I don't like.95
Shortly following this exchange, the proposed Article V, section 2
abrogating the five judge rule was accepted by the commission with
nine affirmative votes, two negative votes and one abstention 6
A frequent observation is that the supreme court has unlimited
power to strike down legislative acts. This, of course, is not true,
first, because the court is confined to only those controversies that
enter the court system and are appealed to it; second, because a
constitutional issue must be properly before the court, having
climbed the procedural ladder on appeal; and third, because the
94 Sen. Whitney, appointed by the legislature from Chappell, served on
subcommittee 2 of the commission which dealt with the legislative
and executive articles. Sen. Whitney also was the chairman of the
commission as a whole.
95 1970 PROcEEDiNGs OF THE NEBRAsKA CoNsTTUTIONAL REviSION CoM-
mission).
96 REPORT OF THE NEBnzsKA CoNsTtTUTIONAL REVISION CommIssIoN, supra
note 3, at 150.
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court is reluctant to set a legislative act aside,97 therefore it imposes
upon itself court rules and rules of practice (often referred to as
judicial restraint) to restrict constitutional claims.9 8 Some of the
judicial restraints that the Nebraska Supreme Court has impressed
upon itself and interested parties are:
1. Written notice must be given to the clerk of the court that a
case has been filed which raises the constitutionality of a statute
as an issue.9 9 The legislature and executive are thereby given notice
and may enter the dispute to preserve the statute.
2. It is a fundamental rule that "[a]ll acts of the Legislature are
presumed to be constitutional."'0 0
3. "In construing an act of the Legislature, all reasonable doubts
must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality." 101
4. The invariable practice of the court is to avoid constitutional
questions unless they are imperatively required.
0 2
5. "A litigant who invokes the provisions of a statute... may not
-seek the benefit of it and at the same time question its constitution-
ality." -0 3 And the litigant must have been adversely affected by the
statute.1o4
6. A constitutional issue must normally have been raised in the
97 Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W. 421 (1902).
98 There is an analysis of these judicial restraints in Comment, The
"Five-Judge" Rule In Nebraska, supra note 8, at 339-41.
99 NEB. Sup. CT. R. 18.
100 Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 774, 123 N.W.2d 844, 849 (1963). See
Norlanco, Inc. v. County of Madison, 186 Neb. 100, 181 N.W.2d 119
(1970); Arrow Club, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 177
Neb. 686, 131 N.W.2d 134 (1964); Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. City of
Omaha, 171 Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d 397 (1961).
-101 State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173 Neb. 195, 200, 113
N.W.2d 63, 67 (1962). See Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation Dist. v.
Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950).
102 Central Markets West, Inc. v. State, 186 Neb. 79, 180 N.W.2d 880
(1970); Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d 844 (1963);
Wilson v. Marsh, 162 Neb. 237, 75 N.W.2d 723 (1956).
103 Shields v. City of Kearney, 179 Neb. 49, 51, 136 N.W.2d 174, 175
(1965). See Kansas-Nebraska Nat. Gas Co., Inc. v. City of Sidney, 186
Neb. 168, 181 N.W.2d 682 (1970); Peterson v. Vasak, 162 Neb. 493, 76
N.W.2d 420 (1956).
104 Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967); Metro-
politan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 'N..2d 626
(1966); Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.1.2d 844 (1963).
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trial court'0 5 at the earliest practical opportunity, or it will be
forfeited by the failure to make a timely assertion.10
7. If the legislative act is susceptible of more than one meaning,
the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence
to the fair meaning of the statute, will render it valid."'
8. Since the Nebraska Constitution is not a grant but a restric-
tion of legislative power, the court will enforce only those limita-
tions that the constitution imposes.108
9. If the invalid portions of a statute can be seperated from the
valid portions and the constitutional part enforced independent of
the rest, and the unconstitutional part did not constitute such an
inducement to the passage of the valid part that the statute would
not have been passed without it, the constitutional portions may be
upheld.'0 9 It is the court's duty, if possible, not only to construe
as a whole and harmonize all valid legislation on the same subject,
but also to adopt a construction making all provisions valid." 0
10. The wisdom and propriety of a legislative act are not rele-
vant factors in a test of constitutionality."'
11. Even though an invalid statute furnished the only basis for
105 State v. Tucker, 183 Neb. 577, 162 N.W.2d 774 (1968); State v. Mayes,
183 Neb. 165, 159 N.W.2d 203 (1968); State v. Schwade, 177 Neb. 844,
131 N.W.2d 421 (1964). State v. Goodseal, 186 Neb. 359, 183 N.W.2d
258 (1971) is an example where the court overlooked the failure to
raise the constitutionality of NEB. RBv. STAT. § 29-114 (Supp. 1969),
the Self-Defense Act, and declared the act invalid.
106 Norlanco, Inc. v. County of Madison, 186 Neb. 100, 181 N.W.2d 119
(1970).
107 State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467, 183 N.W.2d 911 (1971); State ex rel.
Meyer v. Duxbury, 183 Neb. 302, 160 N.W.2d 88 (1968); State ex rel.
Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173 Neb. 195, 113 N.W.2d 63 (1962);
Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 609, 107 N.W.2d
397 (1961).
108 Snyder v. Woxo, Inc., 185 Neb. 545, 177 N.W.2d 281 (1970); United
Community Serv. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576(1956).
109 State ex rel. Meyer v. Duxbury, 183 Neb. 302, 160 N.W.2d 88 (1968);
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 179 Neb.
817, 140 N.W.2d 668 (1966).
110 Hinman v. Temple, 133 Neb. 268, 274 N.W. 605 (1937); Dinuzzo v.
State, 85 Neb. 351, 123 N.W. 309 (1909).
111 State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173 Neb. 195, 113 N.W.2d
63 (1962).
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the judgment of a court in a prior proceeding, the judgment is not
thereby rendered subject to collateral attack.112
These self-imposed restraints have greatly limited the supreme
court's review of constitutional questions. An examination of the
cases where the court has struck down legislative acts reveals the
fact that the court has not abused its judicial discretion" 3 and the
court's own restraints have probably proven more of an inhibiting
factor than the five judge rule. 14
The finality of a legislative act does not rest ultimately in the
supreme court, for the court's decision can be circumvented by
three direct methods and one indirect method. First, by passing a
new statute that has remedied the imperfections in the invalid act,
the legislature may effectively nullify the supreme court's deci-
sion." 5 The second method of reversal is by appealing the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's decision to the United States Supreme
Court. However, this procedure is limited."6 The third direct attack
upon the court's holding is by amending the constitution in one of the
two constitutionally prescribed manners.117 Finally, the indirect
method of avoiding the impact of the court's decision is to remove
one or more of the justices by the electoral process," s by impeach-
112 Norlanco, Inc. v. County of Madison, 186 Neb. 100, 181 N.W.2d 119
(1970).
113 Comment, The "Five-Judge" Rule In Nebraska, supra note 8, at 341-46,
348.
"4 Id. at 346-47.
"15 For example, in Anderson v. Carlson, 171 Neb. 741, 107 N.W.2d 535
(1961), the supreme court held the Rural Cemetery District Act,
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 12-901 to -908 (Reissue 1962), unconstitutional,
which led the legislature to repeal the act, Neb. Laws c. 27, § 14
(1961), and pass a new Rural Cemetery District Act, Neb. Laws c. 27,
§§ 1-13 (1961).
116 This method can only be taken by two routes: first, through an appeal
where the validity of a treaty or a federal statute is denied or where
a state statute prevails over the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States; or second, by a writ of certiorari where the validity
of a treaty or statute of the United States is questioned, where a state
statute's validity is contested on the ground that it is repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where some
right, immunity or privilege is claimed under the Constitution, treaties,
or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
117 The constitution may be amended by the legislature calling a con-
stitutional convention, NEB. CONST. art. XVI, § 1, or by the legislature
proposing amendments and submitting them to the people for their
assent, NEB. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 2.
118 NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21.
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ment," 9 or by a citizen recommending to the Commission on Judi-
cial Qualifications that it examine the judicial qualifications of the
judge.120
V. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Legislature has before it now Legislative Bill 304
which would abolish the five judge rule and allow a simple major-
ity of the members sitting to pronounce a decision in all cases.12 '
Considering the role of the judiciary in the governmental system,
the limited nature of the supreme court and its self-imposed re-
straints, and the efficiency of litigating private and public interests,
the legislature should submit LB 304 to the electorate, and the
people of the state should ratify it as a necessary and desirable
adjunct to the preservation of constitutional limitations and rights.
Referring to the proposed constitution and its expanded powers
for the legislature, Robert McKelvie, 122 a member of the Consti-
tutional Revision Commission, stated:
[W]e're expected to delegate and have confidence in the Legislature
to pass a certain amount of legislation that we're deleting from the
Constitution; and I likewise would like to feel that we should have
a corresponding confidence in the court not to legislate but to make
their type of interpretations. I think the greater majority of them
do anyway.123
William Jay Riley '72
119 NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 17 and art. IV, § 5.
120 NEB. CoNsT. art. V, § 30.
121 L.B. 304, 82d Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. (1971).
122 Mr. McKelvie, from Alma, was appointed by the governor and chaired
subcommittee 3 of the Nebraska Constitutional Revision Commission
which was assigned the articles on revenue, counties, and corpor-
ations.
123 1970 PRocmum s or nm NEBRASKA CONS TUTiONAL RLmsIoN Com-
mssION, supra note 95, at 327.
